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ABSTRACT 
 
 
What, When and Where to Develop? The purpose of this study is to help find the major areas of 
opportunity for housing development and production in Mexico. The thesis intends to help developers 
in their eternal quest for the right product, location and timing. The answer to these questions will not 
only help developers with decision making regarding housing projects, but will be helpful to the industry 
as a whole. It will help lending institutions determine which projects to finance and will be a valuable 
tool for local and federal governments in determining which cities and income levels or housing 
products need higher government subsidy or support. 
 
The number of housing units sold in Mexico in the last decade has almost quadrupled, yet market 
forecasts generated by institutions and developers seem negligible. A greater effort to assess the 
housing demand and deficit has been made by private institutions and government entities which 
finance most housing sales in the country, while developers seem only to go as far as is necessary to 
secure financing for their respective projects. 
 
This study provides an outlook of the housing markets in Mexico and includes an analysis of what is 
currently being done to measure and forecast housing demand. The thesis concludes with rigorous 
economics analysis intended to forecast markets through a Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model. The 
model uses 15 years of historical data on housing prices, inventories and sales with economic and 
demographic variables to create forecasts for seven cities representing each of the seven regions the 
country was segmented into for the study.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis topic was born of an interest in answering housing developers’ three critical questions: what, 
when and where is it best to develop? In other words, I am hopeful that the conclusions drawn from 
research detailed herein will help developers in their efforts to target the right locations, products, and 
timing for housing development in Mexico. 
In the last decade the number of housing mortgage loans has more than tripled. Driven by a growing 
supply of mortgage financing from 1998 to 2008 the number of new housing sales has, correspondingly, 
almost quadrupled and the sales value is up approximately 8.3 fold in real terms over the same period. 
According to Softec’s research, the robust housing market offers developers attractive opportunities, 
with returns averaging nearly 20%, but where it is still possible to find projects yielding returns on 
capital in excess of 50% and margins, before taxes, above 15%. 
Though the housing industry in Mexico has performed well, signs of oversupply are apparent. Changing 
supply and demand fundamentals suggest that investors must thoroughly underwrite and evaluate each 
market they wish to enter: “the myth of the Mexican Housing Shortage has made many unwary 
developers enter markets that do not have depth or duration”
1
. 
Little formal study has been conducted to determine methods for measuring housing demand.  
Completed studies are often limited to an analysis of the mortgage supply as predictive of housing 
demand. This thesis is intended to illustrate a new, alternative analytical process by which to measure 
and forecast Mexican housing markets.  
The study first provides readers with an outlook on the Mexican housing system, followed by an 
assessment of current market conditions. Chapter three details current practices undertaken to 
                                                           
1
 “Mexican Housing Overview 2008,” Softec, S.C., January 2008. 
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measure and forecast housing demand and the final chapter highlights an original econometric 
approach to forecasting using a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) Model. 
The VAR model is used to analyze 15 years of historical housing price, inventory and sales data, together 
with economic and demographic variables. The model establishes a framework within which to develop 
forecasts for seven Mexican cities representing each of 7 distinct regions of the country.  
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CHAPTER 1:        
HOUSING SYSTEM 
NATIONAL/MACRO OUTLOOK 
Over the past decade Mexico’s economic environment has improved significantly, mainly due to 
improving macroeconomic fundamentals, including diminishing inflation rates, increased Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and low unemployment rates. Each contributed to improved investor 
confidence and morale, and  to reduced economic volatility in the country. 
After the 1994/1995 crisis, GDP recovered and has continued growing, in real terms, with GDP per 
Capita also growing at a slightly slower pace.  
 
 
   Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product 
 
With the exception of 2001, when the country experienced limited growth, Real GDP and GDP per 
Capita have demonstrated positive growth each year since 1995.  
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 Figure 2: GDP Annual Percentage Change 
 
 
  Figure 3: Inflation and Interest Rate 
After reaching a high of 52% in 1995, inflation dropped back to the single digits in 2000, where it 
remained for most of the last decade. It is important to note, however, that inflation peaked above 
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expectations at the end of 2008 at 6.2%. In response, the Central Bank seeks to decrease inflation in 
2009 to approximately 3.5%.  
In addition to inflation, interest rates 
dropped into single digits in late 2001 
after peaking at 75% in April of 1995 
(CETES 28). Interest rates are expected 
to close 2009 at 5.4% (see Exhibit A). 
Diminishing interest rates and lower 
intermediation margins reflected in 
lower mortgage payments and 
increased purchasing power for 
homebuyers.  
 
 
        Figure 4: Unemployment Rate 
 
Improving macroeconomic conditions with less expensive mortgage financing, single digit 
unemployment rates and a drop in mortgage delinquency rates (from 33% in 1998 to a low 3.4% in 
2008), generated the needed environment for housing financing.  
Mortgage payment per thousand pesos 
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    Figure 5: Delinquency Rate 
 
HOUSING FINANCING 
After the collapse of Mexico’s economy in the 1994/1995 crisis banks halted mortgage lending. As a 
result, over the balance of the 1990s housing financing was primarily supplied by public entities and 
SOFOLES. In the early 2000s private banks re-initiated mortgage lending but found themselves at a 
marked disadvantage to SOFOLES. In an effort to regain market share many mergers and acquisitions 
took place, including the acquisition of Hipotecaria Nacional by BBVA Bancomer. Hipotecaria Nacional, 
the largest private mortgage lender at the time, now operates as Bancomer’s mortgage arm and 
continues to maintain a position as Mexico’s leading private mortgage lender. 
The supply of mortgage financing has driven the housing markets. “Historically, there was an endemic 
scarcity of funds for mortgage lending, often more than market and demand variables, this variable has 
defined the size and purchasing power of the market”
2
. 
 
 
                                                           
2
 “Mexican Housing Overview 2008,” Softec, S.C., January 2008. 
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Figure 6: Financing Flow 
 
The main players of the mortgage market are: 
• INFONAVIT - Mandatory mutual savings and mortgage lending system for private sector 
employees. Has an aggressive mortgage origination program that is aimed mainly at lower 
income employees. 
• FOVISSSTE - Mandatory mutual savings and mortgage lending system for government 
employees and teachers. 
• SHF - National development bank that facilitates the availability of mortgage financing. 
• FONHAPO - Federal program to provide housing to low income families. 
• CONAVI - Coordinates housing policy efforts at all government levels with the housing industry, 
and facilitates the largest subsidy program for affordable housing instituted by the federal 
government. 
• SOFOLES - Private specialized mortgage lenders that receive funding, originate and package 
mortgages, and sell packages as mortgaged backed securities (MBS) to either third parties or 
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF). 
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* Total mortgages originated deducting the loans or subsidies counted by more than one institution 
Figure 7: Number of Loans and Subsidies Originated 
 
In the last decade the number of housing mortgage loans has more than tripled, with an aggressive 
government housing plan increasing the number of loans originated from 196,300 in 1998 to 655,500 in 
2006. More specifically, each Infonavit and Fovissste quintupled the number of loans provided over the 
same 10 year period. Infonavit 
currently accounts for almost 57% 
of all new loans originated and up 
to 40% of the debt originated. 
Fovissste is responsible for 9% of 
new loans and debt originated.  
   
 Figure 8:  Share of Number of Loans Originated 
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Private lending has gained market share throughout the decade and although it only accounts for 25% of 
the number of loans originated, it accounts for up to 45% of the total debt originated. This is largely 
because banks focus lending efforts 
on medium and high income families 
to which they can offer additional 
banking services and larger loan 
amounts. Contrastingly public 
entities and government programs 
typically focus on low income 
families (affordable housing). 
Recently, however, Infonavit’s 
aggressive program initiatives and successful fundraising through the use of Residential Mortgaged 
Backed Securities (RMBS) have led the institute to implement alternative programs intended to help 
originate loans for medium income families. 
HOUSING MARKETS 
Driven by the supply of mortgage financing in the last decade (1998-2008) the number of housing sales 
has nearly quadrupled, with an increase in sales volume of approximately 730%, in real terms. After the 
crisis during the mid 1990s, and up until 1999, the overall average home price dropped by 48%.  
However, with the return of private banks to the mortgage markets, prices bounced back and reached 
1994 levels by 2007. Prices continued to increase and in 2009 are currently 30% above those from 1994. 
The shift in average home prices responds to the mix of residential products that make up the hosing 
sales volume. After the economic crisis average prices dropped because of a higher share of affordable 
housing in the sales volume. With the return of the private banks, high end residential products 
Figure 9: Share of Debt Amount Originated 
16 | P a g e  
 
represent a more substantial share of the overall sales volume, increasing the average home sale prices. 
The next section illustrates an analysis of the housing market by product type. 
 
Figure 10: Home Sales and Average Prices 
The trends in average home sizes and prices per square meter also reflect the change in the sales mix. 
The average house size and price per square meter drop when there’s a higher share of smaller 
affordable homes trading in the for–sale market. Correspondingly, both house size and average price 
per square meter rise when bigger expensive residential products increase their share of the sales mix. 
 
Figure 11: Average Home Price per Square Meter and Size 
Source: Data from Softec 
Source: Data from Softec 
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New job creation has decelerated with formal employment growth rate measured at 0.1%
3
 as of the end 
of 2008.  The risk of a rising unemployment rate and a significant contraction in consumption could 
impact the demand for housing, making it difficult for mortgage lenders to achieve allocation goals 
despite their financing capabilities. With strong fundamentals, a housing deficit estimated at 4.5 million 
houses and annual demand estimated at 1 million new houses
4
, the continuous flow of mortgage and 
construction lending remain critical to the avoidance of a contraction of the housing sector. 
Besides the housing deficit, for which estimates are varied, a steady annual population growth of 1.0% 
and the declining number of occupants per home, from 4.3 in 2000 to 4.0 in 2005, implying an additional 
1.5% growth in housing demand, suggest an annual housing growth potential of 2.5% of the stock. The 
actual housing stock grew an average 2.1% over the same period
5
. Current housing development rate 
remains below 2.5% of total housing stock, however market participants must be careful not to 
overbuild. As development rate rises above new household formation the additional housing would be 
eating up on the difficult to measure housing deficit, which is highly concentrated in the lowest end of 
the income stratus.  
MARKET SEGMENTATION 
The housing market can be segmented by price ranges into the following product types: 
Segment Price Range* Income Level 
Social Up to 250 Affordable Entry Level 
Economica 250 - 480 Affordable Entry Level 
Media 480 - 1,200 Middle Income 
Residencial 1,200 - 2,700 Residential 
Residencial Plus 2,700 and up Residential Plus 
* Thousands of pesos   
            Figure 12: Market Segmentation 
                                                           
3
 See Exhibit A 
4
 Cano, Ariel. (February 2009). Director, CONAVI (Housing National Commission). NYC: “Mexico’s Housing Day”. 
5
 Data from INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography). Population and Housing Census. 
18 | P a g e  
 
After the 1994/1995 crisis, home sales dropped and private banks abandoned the mortgage market. 
With their return to the mortgage market coupled with solid macroeconomic conditions, sales have 
experience a booming growth. We can clearly notice the effects of the exit and re-entry of the private 
banks on the volume of sales of expensive residential products (Media and up). In 2008 such product 
sales accounted for 71% of the volume of sales.  
 
Figure 13: Home Sales 
 
Figure 14: Home Sales (Units) 
Source: Data from Softec 
Source: Data from Softec 
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Although most of the sales volume is made up by 
the higher income segments, the housing market 
has responded well to the government’s 
aggressive housing program and support, focused 
mainly on  affordable housing (Social and 
Economica). Affordable housing, which made up 
29% of the sales volume and accounted for 70% 
of the total number of units sold in 2008. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the average 
home sales price has shifted over time, reflecting 
the change in the product mix in the sales volume. 
But with a small field for speculation because most 
of the loans are aimed at first time homebuyers, 
when we look at real home prices by segment, 
prices are still below 1994 ranges for all segments.  
Figure 15: Market Share of Home Sales 
Figure 17: Market Share of Home Sales (Units) 
Figure 16: Home Prices by Segment Source: Data from Softec 
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Following the 1995 crisis, prices in most segments of the market remained flat with high-end residential 
products (Residential Plus and Vacional) climbing closer to 1994 levels. That said, despite a 2008 price 
increase of 22%, product prices for this residential product is still 10% below 1994 levels. The most 
affordable housing (Social), due to price restrictions and ceilings instituted by public entities and 
regulation, is still 27% below 1994 levels, and has seen no price change since 1996. All other segments 
show a steady annual growth of less than 1%, and remain 18% below 1994 prices. 
 
Figure 18: Home Sizes by Segment 
As seen in Figure 11 the average home size and price per square meter have also shifted according to 
the change in the sales mix. But the average home size by segment has been decreasing over time. 
 
Figure 19: Home Prices per Square Meter by Segment 
Source: Data from Softec 
Source: Data from Softec 
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The slight decrease in home size, together with flat home prices for most segments, has resulted in an 
increase in actual home prices on a per square meter basis. The high-end residential products that have 
experienced an increase in average home prices in the recent past, have also experienced an even 
higher increase in average prices per square meter. With the 2008 price increments, most segments, 
with the exception of the affordable entry level (Social and Economica), reached prices per square meter 
that exceed 1994 levels. 
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CHAPTER 2:        
CURRENT HOUSING SITUATION 
ONGOING CRISIS 
Mexico’s economy has slowed because of the country’s close links with the U.S. economy (Figure 20), 
but finds itself in a much better position now than just 10 years ago. With strong policy frameworks and 
balance sheets, the economy is better positioned to absorb external shocks with the opportunity to 
implement policies to offset the impact of the current economic downturn
6
. 
 
 Figure 20: Mexico Vs United States Production 
 
As demonstrated by the behavior of the stock markets in previous economic crisis (1995, 1998 and 
2002) Mexico like other Latin American countries, recovered rapidly after hitting bottom. Markets rallied 
aggressively rather than first stabilizing and then staging a rally (See Figure 21).  
 
 
 
                                                           
6
 Negrete, Sergio. (March 2009). Global Crisis Weighs on Outlook for Mexico. IMF Survey Magazine. 
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Crisis: Peak to Trough performance 
 
 
  Crisis: Trough to 3-month peak performance 
 
Figure 21: Latin American Stock Markets in Economic Crisis 
 
CURRENT SITUATION OF THE HOUSING MARKET 
The housing market is currently slowing down, mainly due to financing restrictions consequence of 
banks headquartered in countries with a strong real estate crisis and an overall negative assessment of 
the real estate environment
7
. Housing developers and homebuyers are rapidly feeling the impact of 
increasing regulations and policies when attempting to access capital and qualify for loans. Still, 2008 
was a strong year for the Mexican housing market, with an 11% increase in the number of units sold in 
2007 and a 31% increase in the volume of sales, which was driven by increasing sales of high end 
residential products.  
During 2008 Infonavit achieved its goal to originate 500,000 loans, a historical high for the institute, and 
hoping for an upward economy by the end of 2009 Infonavit holds its 500,000 origination goal. With 
enough resources for 450,000 it would only need to issue bonds for the remaining 50,000 loans.  
                                                           
7
 Requejo, Victor. (March 2009). The Housing Train. El Economista 19. 
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Under the current administration Fovissste has been undergoing significant restructuring and 
modernization. With an aggressive loan origination program it reached historical highs for the first half 
of the year and on the 25
th
 of June of 2009 entered the market by issuing there first Residential 
Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) for 3,500 million pesos. The funds generated from the issue will be 
used to achieve a mortgage origination goal for 2009 of 100,000 loans, nearly 25% higher than their 
2008 origination
8
. 
 The rest of the public entities, government programs and private banks have set 2009 annual lending 
goals above those achieved in 2008, with private banks expecting a 7.5% to 9.5% aggregate growth in 
the number of loans originated
9
. 
According to Softec, in July of 2008 housing project starts dropped to 600 down from 1,600 in 2007. The 
lack of construction financing is restricting housing supply, causing a decline in inventories.  Together 
with a more conservative approach to mortgage lending, it will be difficult for lenders to reach their 
respective goals, even if they possess the resources to originate. Some lenders, like Infonavit, are 
looking to the existing housing market to help them achieve origination goals
10
. 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
Average home prices experienced an 18% increase in 2008 and a 16% increase in prices per square 
meter, reflecting a slight increase in average home sizes. All housing segments realized an increase in 
average prices except for the affordable entry level homes (Social and Economica), which experienced 
an insignificant price change. Meanwhile construction prices rose 9.6%, with an 11.4% increase in 
material costs and a 3.5% increase in labor costs. This suggests that developers were generally able to 
offset higher average construction costs with increased sales prices. Developers, however, were forced 
                                                           
8
 Realiza Fovissste primera emision de Cedevis, (June 2009), Real Estate Market and Lifestyle. 
9
 Fernandez, Gonzalo. (February 2009). Latin America Equity Research. Santander Bank. 
10
 Mixed National Council of Housing Developers at Infonavit, (June 2009), Session at CANADEVI. 
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to reduce margins for affordable housing products, an outcome easily explained by price restrictions 
established by governing public entities. 
Although international material prices are currently falling, they are still to materialize in the domestic 
market due to losses on the currency exchange rate which makes imported materials more expensive. 
The currency (Mexican peso) is currently perceived to be undervalued and is expected to appreciate in 
the near future, which would make materials cheaper and could contribute to a lower aggregate cost for 
housing production. 
REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Although 2008 was a strong year for housing, throughout the year differences across regions and 
segments was increasingly evident. Regions showing a noticeable slowdown were those more highly 
exposed to the U.S. economy. These regions can be grouped by
11
: 
• Tourist Destinations (Cancun, Los Cabos, Puerto Vallarta, Ixtapa and Acapulco) 
Where a big part of the housing supply is intended and constructed for International buyers, 
predominantly for U.S. residents as a retirement, investment or second home. With the economic 
recession, U.S. consumers have become more cautious and lost purchasing power and investment 
capability. The local economies and 
local home buyers in these cities are 
also highly dependent on the tourism 
sector. 
• U.S. Border Regions (Baja California, 
Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, 
Sonora and Tamaulipas) 
                                                           
11
 “Situacion Inmobiliaria,” Estudios Economicos BBVA Bancomer, January 2009 and September 2008. 
Figure 22: Regional Price Performance 
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Here the industrial and commercial relationships with the US have slowed domestic GDP growth; 
regions that usually experienced above average employment rates are now facing above national 
average unemployment rates, effectively lowering the demand for housing and increasing the 
delinquency rate on mortgage loans. 
• Remittances Regions (Michoacan, Veracruz, Edo de Mexico and Zacatecas) 
Remittances account for a substantial portion of Mexico’s economy (2.7% of GDP), above Tourism 
and Foreign Domestic Investment and in some states like Michoacan they account for up to 13% of 
the State’s GDP (See Figure 23). After years of growth remittances reached a historical high in 2007, 
with the US economic recession remittances dropped 3.6% in 2008 and continue to drop through 
2009 recording an 11% fall during the first five months of the year
12
. 
 
            Source: Banco de Mexico 
           Figure 23: Remittances by State 
As shown by Figure 23 regional performance is highly dependent on the location’s connection to the 
U.S. economy. Beach destinations resulting as the most affected followed by border regions. The inner 
                                                           
12
 “Remittances to Mexico fall,” The Wall Street Journal, July 2009. 
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regions of the country are less exposed to the U.S. recession, demonstrating a steady performance with 
no signs of contraction. The only exceptions are those interior areas with high dependency on US 
remittances. 
INCOME LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Throughout the country and within the 
described regions, the behavior is also 
significantly differentiated by housing 
segments. Affordable entry level segments 
(Economica and Social) demonstrate a 
positive behavior, middle income housing 
shows a steady performance, and a negative 
trending is evident for the high-end 
residential products (Residencial and 
Residencial Plus)
13
. 
Average inventory levels have remained relatively stable but, as shown on the above graph, inventories 
for lower income levels have decreased while inventories for higher income levels have significantly 
increased. The strong performance by the affordable entry level submarket is backed by high unmet 
demand and by the government’s aggressive affordable housing programs. 
The commencement of government programs for middle income housing has contributed significantly 
to its recent performance, with Cofinavit (Infonavit’s middle income lending program) representing 24% 
of the institute’s loans in 2008, up from only 1% in 2003. 
                                                           
13
 BBVA Bancomer refers to housing segments by A, B, C, D and E, which correspond to Social, Economica, Media, 
Residencial and Residencial Plus respectively. 
Figure 24: Housing Inventories 
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High-end residential products, especially in tourist destinations, have been the most affected by the 
current market, with increasing inventories and falling prices; it will continue to contract throughout 
2009 while inventories are reduced. When will the foreign homebuyers return? It is difficult to forecast 
do to the complexity and lack of knowledge of 2
nd
 homebuyer demand patterns. 
POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
Mexico’s close connection with to the receding U.S. economy and lower international oil prices call for 
policy-makers to intervene in order to offset the impact of the current downturn.  
The authorities have been proactive in taking the appropriate measures to mitigate liquidity constraints 
in the financial markets and to implement counter-cyclical measures to offset the impact of global 
turmoil. 
Within the housing sector public entities are committing to greater lending volume by increasing lending 
goals. This is a key element to avoid contraction of the sector. Other issues that policy-makers should 
address are: 
• Regional support by fast tracking resources and infrastructure investments to regions needing to 
control falling house prices and increasing inventories. 
• The promotion of vertical production through incentives for developers and regulations that 
contribute to increased densities and a superior usage of existing public infrastructure. This 
effort should also create more regulation for taxation of undeveloped land within city limits; 
• The regional designation of housing income levels and prices instead of a national definition, to 
target and address the income levels it’s intended to, rather than simply imposing uniform 
housing prices and income levels across the country.  
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• There is a strong financial commitment by mortgage originators for the supply of home and 
construction loans, but policy intervention could be used to ensure that increased regulation 
and rigid requirements don’t preclude developers and homebuyers from securing financing. 
• The determination of an accurate and real housing deficit by region and income level in order to 
appropriately plan for future development and infrastructure placement. 
DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
From a developer’s perspective the areas of opportunity are found in the inner regions that show strong 
fundamentals, with steady growth, decreasing inventories, and strong housing demand. These interior 
areas are less exposed to the U.S. economic recession, and exclude tourist and border destinations. 
Low income housing hedges against market and financing restrictions but require a thorough cost 
analysis by region. Despite the fact that government programs help lower inventories and improve cash 
flows, prescribed price ceilings make it difficult to achieve the appropriate returns in some regions 
where higher costs prevail. 
Middle income housing continues to offer potential, with minimum price restrictions and accessibility to 
both public and private resources. The results of Infonavit’s middle income lending programs are yet to 
be capitalized upon. During 2008 due to an inaccurate measure of the program’s demand, resources 
allocated run out around midway through the calendar year. The programs will now be expanded and 
private banks will contribute with a higher share of the loans originated to avoid a future shortage of 
funds. 
EXISTING HOME SALES 
The focus of mortgage originators on first time homebuyers and on new housing resulted in few loan 
originations for existing homes. Infonavit, with its aggressive program, is quickly responding to this 
market; approximately 30% of its revised program is aimed at existing homeowners.  
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Developers and some government officials prefer loans to be assigned to new housing, arguing that only 
new housing creates employment. They further argue that new housing is preferred because it is built 
according to the institute’s new energy efficient standards. 
With only 12% of the housing stock mortgaged, and about 75% of all homes 100% equity owned, home 
equity loans and existing home financing represent the highest growth opportunities for the mortgage 
market in Mexico. Resultantly, banks have concentrated on the existing home market as they have 
reentered the market
 14
. 
Due to scarce mortgage origination for existing homes and the high transaction costs associated with 
such sales, most of the transactions in this market are informal, unrecorded transactions. It is estimated 
that over 90% of all transactions are of an informal nature
15
. In many cases the transactions include a 
mortgage transfer, where the home buyer simply continues to pay the existing loan on behalf of the 
seller while the legal obligation assigned to the original borrower remains intact throughout the loan. 
It is difficult to obtain accurate figures denoting existing home sales due to the informal nature of the 
accounting, but it is estimated that in 2004 about 25% of all home sales involved existing homes, and 
that in 2009, the total will likely reach 50%
16
.  
RENTAL HOUSING  
The rental housing market represents only 14.6% of the total dwellings in the country and it is practically 
nonexistent at the affordable entry level
17
. Compared with other countries this is a very small proportion 
of rental units, a phenomenon that exists as a result of poor market conditions. 
According to a rental housing study performed by SHF intended to precipitate an increase in rental 
housing investment in Mexico, the current market conditions are unfavorable. The study indicates that 
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investing in for-rent units has an annual yield below the CETES 28 (Treasury bond) rate. Some of the 
main constrains of the market are
18
:  
• Markets with ceilings on starting rental fees; 
• Controlled rents that regulate the annual increases on rental fees; 
• Controversy between landowner and tenants that, on average, lasts nine months; 
• Higher tax burden for corporations than for individuals holding rental units. 
According to Softec there is no institutional market for multifamily rental property, although tax 
legislation introduced in 2004 governing REITs structure, overregulation, scarce financing, complicated 
evictions and collections, and marginal returns (below those offered by Mexican Treasury bonds) have 
kept institutions out of operation
19
.   
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CHAPTER 3:        
DEVELOPERS AND CURRENT PRACTICES 
“The big housing deficit had developers believe that everything they built was a sure sale. Their numbers 
already contradict this statement. Last year average inventories grew by 15%. Specifically, those of 
Homex and Geo grew by 34.6% and 27.4% respectively”
20
. The slowdown of the housing markets, 
especially in high-end residential projects, together with the lack of availability of construction loan 
financing has developers across the country reconfiguring their strategies.  
Situations are varied across markets, regions and product types, hence it is only reasonable that 
different developers are experiencing different outcomes and implementing different strategies. 
Nonetheless certain common trends and patterns can be easily identified among most developers. 
In order to determine how housing developers are responding to the current market conditions and to 
make an assessment of current practices used to measure and forecast the housing markets, prominent 
industry players were interviewed. Interviewees included both private and public developers, lenders 
and key housing institutions.  
HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
Real estate has always been especially local, and Mexico’s housing markets are no exception. Highly 
fragmented, no single developer has a consistent national market share greater than 10%
21
. With over 
2,600 homebuilding companies
22
 in the country only six are publicly traded on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange and only Homex is also traded on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker symbol HXM). 
. 
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In 2007 the eight largest developers were responsible for almost 43% of the units sold but only 23% of 
the total value of sales. The top four developers, which were among those interviewed for this study, 
account for 31% of sales and 16% of the total volume. 
 
       Source: Data from Mexican Housing Overview 2008 
          Figure 25: Market Share of Top Housing Developers 
The housing boom allowed housing developers to grow rapidly, making it possible for public 
homebuilders to achieve an 18% average annual growth rate from 2003 to 2007. The pace of sales 
combined with the “country’s housing demand over the next 20 years of the construction of what has 
been built in its history”
23
 made it easy for companies to establish strategic growth and business plans to 
at least double company size every five years. These aggressive goals and strategies are now being 
revised. 
PUBLIC VS PRIVATE DEVELOPERS 
The lack of construction loan financing is forcing developers to halt housing production. Particularly 
affected are the country’s private developers. The current competitive environment of the housing 
markets and the difficulty of securing financing for new projects is forcing poorly capitalized, less 
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sophisticated developers to exit the market or cease operation. The number of homebuilders registered 
in Infonavit has already dropped from 1800 to 700 developers
24
. This creates improved opportunity for 
public homebuilders that are still able to access capital markets in efforts to advance new and current 
projects
25
. 
 
Source: Data from Homex 
Figure 26: Public Homebuilders Sales and Market Share 
CURRENT SITUATION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter developers confirm increasing inventories of more expensive 
residential products and a slowing market due to mortgage lending restrictions created by private 
banks. They are also experiencing a significant slowdown in border regions were they had historically 
experienced strong absorption and returns. With the industrial sector downsizing, developers are losing 
customers before they are able to close on the property sale. Often a client that has agreed to purchase 
a house and is still in the mortgage origination process or is waiting for construction of the home to be 
finished will no longer be eligible for a mortgage. As a result the sale is delayed or lost altogether if the 
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buyer loses its job. In these regions reliant on industrial job growth even customers that still have jobs 
are being cautious and are reconsidering home purchasing decisions. 
Tourist projects in beach cities like Mazatlan and Vallarta are also experiencing lower absorption rates as 
wary American buyers retreat. Developers seem unwilling to enter markets in the southern regions of 
the country, like Chiapas or Oaxaca, even though they present elevated housing shortages. The 
prevalence of informal employment in these southern regions makes it hard to secure mortgage 
financing for the potential customers. 
According to Infonavit’s Home Registration system (RUV), registered new housing projects are down 
40% from 2008. The decrease in project totals can be attributed, among other things, to problems with 
the assignment in 2008 of affordable subsidies and to newly implemented energy efficiency regulations 
and restrictions
26
. 
DEFENSIVE HOUSING 
In response to the market most developers are implementing defensive strategies based in affordable 
housing. Although many large developers already had a strong focus on affordable housing, greater 
returns and high demand for more expensive residential products in the recent past lured them beyond 
affordable housing development. As a result, developers faced increased exposure to market volatility, 
characteristic of high-end home development. 
The return on investment for a housing project in Mexico typically ranges from 15% to 35%, but margins 
vary by segment and with the capacity and efficiency of developers. Margins, before taxes, for projects 
in the affordable entry level segment often yield 8% to 15%, middle and residential returns 12% to 20%, 
and Residential Plus yield 15% to 30%
27
. Developers are trying to standardize margins across projects 
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and regions, searching for similar returns on capital, and are asking local branch managers to achieve 
unvarying targeted returns
28
. 
 Now, even though middle income projects were yielding a 25% gross return and affordable entry level 
projects offer 15% returns, higher sales volume, improved absorption rates and the availability of 
mortgage loan financing are driving all developers to concentrate on affordable housing. Anecdotally, 
the top three homebuilders in Mexico are currently attributing between 92% and 94% of total sales 
volumes to the affordable entry level. “Affordable housing lower margins require higher volumes, 
efficiency and cost control. Any delay or cost overrun can mean the difference between winning and 
losing money on a project. Very affordable housing (Social) can be sold anywhere, but not everywhere 
can it be built”
29
. 
Housing Type by Developer 
 
 
 
With a defensive strategy, developers hope to minimize exposure to the volatility of more expensive 
residential products. They have begun to concentrate on affordable housing, a subsector that continues 
to have a strong government support. Such support creates an aggressive origination program for this 
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Figure 27: Housing Type by Developer 
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type of product, making it much less vulnerable to the macroeconomic environment and to overall 
markets conditions. 
Through strategic growth plans developers are taking different approaches. Some are undertaking more 
aggressive plans by entering new markets. Others have begun to focus on expanding market share and 
penetration within their respective operating regions and cities
30
. 
SIZING UP THE MARKET 
Housing demand is heavily determined by the availability of mortgage financing. According to 
developers “They don’t sell houses, they sell loans stapled to houses”, “It’s not the product and the 
client, it’s mortgage loan availability” and “The size of the market is the number of loans available for 
each segment”. Hence, the barometer for the strength of housing markets is mortgage loan availability. 
Over 66% of mortgage loans are originated by Infonavit and Fovissste, which account for almost 50% of 
the total debt originated. Through each institution’s aggressive lending programs developers are able to 
measure demand for affordable housing. The mortgage programs allow developers to ascertain how 
many loans for each product type (housing segment) each institution expects to originate in each city.  
Developers execute an analysis of the institutes’ affiliates by city and segment, calculating how many 
affiliates are eligible for a mortgage loan and how many are yet to exercise a loan. They can then 
estimate how many will elect to exercise their opportunity to obtain a mortgage loan in the near term. 
Developers research databases to find eligible loan candidates and subsequently approach the potential 
customers with the appropriate product type in an effort to encourage them to action. 
Developers are then able to compare the potential demand against market supply and pipeline through 
Infonavit’s Home Registration system (RUV). This system requires that all housing projects that intend to 
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use the institution for mortgage financing must be registered prior to construction. Developers can 
identify oversupply and may attempt to modify the product type to change the targeted segment
31
.  
Middle income residential projects still rely, to a certain extent, on Fovissste and Infonavit’s middle 
income programs, Infonavit Total and Cofinavit. Fovissste has undergone major restructuring and 
renovation during the current administration, however its loan assignation methodology is still 
considered by developers to be obscure. 
HIGHER INCOME RESIDENTIAL PRODUCTS 
Unfortunately, when it comes to high end residential projects there is much less information available 
and less market analysis is performed by the real estate industry. Analysis is usually restrained to field 
studies designed to calculate average absorption rates of comparable projects and to estimate 
surrounding supply. Developers then simply make bets on markets with the highest absorption rates. 
In the past six years, the number of developers grew from 800 to 3,000, resulting in a highly competitive 
environment
32
. The competitive environment with increasing inventories gave developers a high 
exposure to demand volatility of high-end residential products. As a result, development firms are 
starting to generate more sophisticated studies to correlate projects and housing markets with 
macroeconomic and demographic variables and fundamentals. Some developers have even created 
alliances with demographic institutes to study effective housing demand”
33
. 
Even though inventories for non-affordable projects are growing, developers have a strong conviction 
that the market still demonstrates a large housing deficit that needs to be satisfied, and that “by 
creating the appropriate product with the right market drivers they will be able to successfully deploy 
projects”
34
. Sophisticated, larger homebuilders are accustomed to developing mega projects (above 
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5,000 to 25,000 units) and to making elaborate master plans for regional development that create new 
markets and inherent housing demand. When interviewed, two developers stated: “if you build it they 
will come”. 
When creating mega projects homebuilders identify areas proper for major regional growth and 
development by taking into account urban development master plans, regional government and private 
investment, employment drivers, local government relationships, and willingness of the governing 
agencies to cooperate and publicly disclose information. 
Sophisticated developers have fully staffed marketing departments that constantly seek to identify the 
ideal product type for development. They do SWAT analysis, benchmark, develop field market studies, 
poll focus groups, and track institutional sales. 
Small, less sophisticated private developers do little or no market forecasting. Assessments seem to 
most closely resemble field studies, which consider nearby projects when determining site selection and 
control. Once the small developers obtain site control they are only prevented from moving forward on 
a project by any inability to secure financing, if they’re able to secure a construction loan they will build 
the project, often regardless of market conditions or trends. 
Private Banks’ ability to decide which kinds of projects to finance typically forces the developers to build 
their projects in a way that enables financing. But even private banks and lenders don’t seem to do a 
thorough analysis of the markets. Each player has a market target; private banks target the high-end 
residential markets as they seek to offer homebuyers additional services like credit cards, car loans, etc. 
Sofoles target affordable and middle income residential products according to their funding guidelines 
and restrictions. SHF imposes a price ceiling on the mortgage loans it will guaranty or buy. Private Banks 
continue to finance middle and residential projects, though they are aware of rising inventories, they 
rely on the experience and the relationship with the developer to underwrite a project. The banks 
usually trust developers market studies, which are often self-servingly optimistic. It stands to reason 
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that no developer would ask a bank for a construction loan with a market study that doesn’t support the 
proposed project
35
. 
SALES ESTIMATES 
To determine short term sales, developers look at current projects and sales velocities. For long term 
sales they attempt to reach the certain level of sales that allows them to comply with growth goals and 
business plans. Sales estimates seem to be more closely aligned with corporate growth strategies than 
with market trends or expectations. Contrastingly, markets conditions seem to constantly affect the 
expected corporate growth.   
The first thing developers take into account when generating sales estimates is historical performance. 
They then assign a growth rate to current sales velocities. In order to achieve the necessary sales they 
create strategic growth plans by segment and region to reach an assigned growth rate. An assigned 
growth rate is forecast in current markets and a higher growth rate is estimated in new markets, where 
sophisticated developers try to measure potential market share through effective demand and 
correlations with housing demand fundamentals.  
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CHAPTER 4:           
MARKET FORECASTS – VAR MODEL 
With the significant increase in the volume of mortgage lending during the last decade the Mexican 
housing market has experienced high rates of new housing being added to the existing stock.  With 
some regions and segments showing increasing inventories and oversupply, the financing entities are 
finally recognizing that their ability to originate mortgage loans for new housing is unmatched by market 
effective housing demand for some product types and in some regions. 
In 2005 officially marks the time when financing availability exceed the market’s ability to consume the 
capital
36
. The industry has a “general perception that we have finally reached production equal to 
housing demand, and that the urban structure of Mexican cities is exceeded”
37
. 
The situation requires a more sophisticated analysis of the housing markets based on fundamental 
demand drivers. Relying solely on the supply of mortgage financing to measure demand in the housing 
markets is no longer sufficient to truly determine the market potential and trending. 
Very few studies have been done in the past to estimate housing demand in Mexico. Gonzalez and 
Fontela (2009) try to determine housing demand elasticity to its major components by using data from 
mortgages originated within a two year period. Gonzalez (1997) explains housing demand through 
tenure choice and expenditure on housing services. Other studies have attempted to use hedonic 
pricing models to value housing attributes or to create price indexes. Fierro (2008) used hedonic pricing 
to explain the housing attributes for Ciudad Juarez using a sample of 175 observations. Also, SHF is 
currently working on a national price index (INAPEV) based on hedonic pricing and repeated sales from 
2005 to the present
38
. 
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To date it is my understanding, after a thorough research and review of existing literature, that 
multivariate time series analysis has never been used to measure or forecast Mexico’s housing markets. 
Multivariate time series analysis is used when one wants to model and explain the interactions and co-
movements among a group of time series variables
39
. 
Econometric models are used frequently to measure and forecast markets; in particular macro-
econometricians use multivariate time series to do four things
40
: 
1. Describe and summarize macroeconomic data; 
2. Make macroeconomic forecasts; 
3. Quantify what we do or do not know about the true structure of the macroeconomy; 
4. Advise macroeconomic policymakers. 
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION (VAR) MODEL 
The time series of the data (15 years) permits the use of a vector autoregression (VAR) model to forecast 
Mexico’s housing markets. A longer time series that includes more than one housing cycle would allow 
us to create an independent model for each city. But “the combination of time series with cross-sections 
can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only one of these 
two dimensions”
41
. 
 “The VAR model is one of the most successful, flexible, and easy to use models for the analysis of 
multivariate time series. It is a natural extension of the univariate autoregressive model to dynamic 
multivariate time series. The VAR model has proven to be especially useful for describing the dynamic 
behavior of economic and financial time series and for forecasting. It often provides superior forecasts 
to those from univariate time series models and elaborate theory-based simultaneous equations 
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models. Forecasts from VAR models are quite flexible because they can be made conditional on the 
potential future paths of specified variables in the model”
42
. 
METHODOLOGY 
With the help of RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) software the VAR model allows us to 
correlate time series of our dependant housing variables with independent economic and demographic 
variables to derive equations that reflect market behavior. 
The regression analysis uses the Fixed Effects Model, also known as the Least Squares Dummy Variable 
Model, which uses dummy variables to differentiate across cities with lagged dependent variables to 
account for dynamic effects. This creates a series of models with constant slopes for each market 
segment but with different intercepts for each city.  After creating one dummy variable for each city and 
performing the regression analysis, the constant then becomes the intercept for the default city and the 
constant plus the dummy variable together become the intercept for other cities. 
With the intercepts and coefficients of the regressions we are then able to set an equation for each 
segment and city to forecast the behavior of our dependent housing variables using conditional 
forecasts of the independent variables. 
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REGIONAL SEGMENTATION 
The country was segmented by Softec into eight different regions according to proximity, economic 
development, communications and location. Although housing trends tend to be local, this 
segmentation creates regions with cities that show similar behavioral patterns and housing trends. 
Figure 28: Regional Map 
     Source: Softec 
 
 
For the purpose of this analysis the Tourist region, which includes six important centers, was excluded 
primarily due to the complexity of forecasting second homes. Second home market demand responds to 
different variables, drivers and patterns that are unique to this region. 
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CITIES OF THE STUDY 
One of the most representative cities out of each region was chosen to carry out this study. 
Figure 29: Cities of the Study 
                  
 
              
 
         
Source: Softec 
 
 
 
REGION AND CITY  
 
BORDERS: 
CD. JUAREZ 
 
NORTH: 
HERMOSILLO 
 
METRO: 
GUADALAJARA 
 
GULF: 
VERACRUZ 
 
PACIFIC: 
CULIACAN 
 
CENTER: 
QUERETARO 
 
SOUTH: 
MERIDA 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data consists of annual home prices, sales, inventories and sizes, as provided by Softec, from 1994 
through the first quarter of 2009 for each housing segment of the selected cities. The annual 2009 
housing data is adjusted and estimated from first quarter performance. 
After testing different models and variables for significance and forecasting ability to predict other 
variables (Granger-cause) the final variables used in the model are: 
MODEL'S DATA 
Dependent Variables 
Homes annual data by city and segment 
SALES Number of units sold 
RPSQM Real price per square meter 
INVENT Year's average monthly inventories 
Independent Variables 
POPGR City's population growth 
INTRATE Interest Rate (Average CETES 28) 
GDPCAPGR State's real GDP per capita growth 
Dummy Variables 
D1 For GUADALAJARA 
D2 For HERMOSILLO 
D3 For CD. JUAREZ 
D4 For CULIACAN 
D5 For QUERETARO 
D6 For MERIDA 
  Default city (no dummy) VERACRUZ 
               Figure 30: Model's Data 
The final equations for each of the dependent variables follow: 
SALES = α + DUMMY + β1SALES(-1) + β2RPSQM + β3INVENT + β4INTRATE 
RPSQM = α + DUMMY + β1RPSQM(-1) + β2POPGR + β3GDPCAPGR + β4INTRATE 
INVENT = α + DUMMY + β1INVENT(-1) + β2RPSQM(-1) + β3POPGR + β4GDPCAPGR + β5INTRATE 
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The lack of observations for a given period creates an unbalance panel; it doesn’t mean that prices were 
equal to zero, it only means that there were no transactions recorded in the period. In order to balance 
the data set when observations are missing the regressions ignore all missing or zero values. 
The independent variables were chosen according to their ability to explain the dependent variables. 
However, changes in calculation methodologies (i.e. employment) or the lack of city-level data for some 
variables that could be highly correlated with the housing markets forced the use, testing and 
adjustment of state and national level data in the model. The independent variables used by the model 
are city population growth rates estimated from INEGI’s census data, average interest rates (CETES 28 
days) from Banco de Mexico and real Gross Domestic Product per capita growth calculated from INEGI’s 
data. 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
In the VAR model each variable is explained by its own lagged values, plus current and past values of the 
remaining variables. In data description and forecasting, VARs have proven to be powerful and reliable 
tools that are now, rightly, in everyday use
43
. 
In the case of inventories, the model uses a lagged value of prices as an independent variable. The one 
period lag (one year) is to reflect the time for permitting and construction. High prices encourage new 
construction that gets added to the inventory once it is finished, causing the next period’s inventory to 
grow. 
The model only takes into account new housing, hence it is a supply driven model in which higher 
inventories “Granger causes” sales of new homes to grow.  Without inventory sales of new homes could 
not increase. 
Inventories show a significant positive relation to sales.  Sales also seem to be highly explained by 
interest rates and previous period sales. Lower interest rates mean lower mortgage payments or 
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increased purchasing capacity, which in turn increase home prices.  Higher sellout prices coupled with 
less expensive construction financing yields an increase in housing production and supply. The larger 
inventories allow more home sales. GDP and population growth seem to have a positive effect on prices 
and inventories.  
 
Summary of Statistical Results 
Dependent Variable SALES
Centered R2 0.9171 Centered R2 0.9582 Centered R2 0.9855 Centered R2 0.9804 Centered R2 0.9826
Variable Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Constant 342.2448 0.5586 -694.0850 -0.8279 277.6775 0.9476 13.5980 0.2766 -19.1712 -0.6494
SALES{1} 0.4177 9.7133 0.2630 4.7412 0.6176 24.3595 0.3208 9.1367 0.1643 3.3726 
RPSQM -0.0319 -0.2417 0.2193 1.3873 -0.0213 -0.5170 0.0011 0.2260 0.0014 0.7296 
INVENT 0.3841 14.9677 0.3381 12.9628 0.2080 17.1695 0.4198 19.1313 0.4663 16.8874 
INTRATE -7.1873 -0.9302 -20.7406 -2.6590 -7.7376 -3.0412 -0.7088 -1.2784 -0.0641 -0.2548
D1 -314.4203 -1.1789 1,662.4678 5.0038 210.7898 1.7762 -5.9005 -0.2358 21.3891 1.8757 
D2 78.1054 0.3031 369.6617 1.3020 20.0391 0.1944 -51.1599 -2.2152 7.6226 0.5231 
D3 365.1437 1.4254 609.5176 2.1459 136.6094 1.3752 11.2478 0.5176 13.7079 1.1951 
D4 -397.5841 -1.5318 597.3333 2.0940 71.2004 0.6621 -66.0802 -2.6915 12.5623 1.0015 
D5 -286.8109 -1.0973 991.4430 3.4671 95.6996 0.9311 -2.6362 -0.1149 12.2427 0.9512 
D6 274.6412 1.0079 539.2025 1.6227 -20.3479 -0.1674 15.1247 0.5883 9.4426 0.5694 
Dependent Variable RPSQM
Centered R2 0.6551 Centered R2 0.7903 Centered R2 0.7019 Centered R2 0.7225 Centered R2 0.7799
Variable Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Constant 3,023.3354 8.0569 2,352.3802 7.0185 3,891.9025 7.4962 4,460.3112 5.3700 7,148.5516 5.0299 
RPSQM{1} 0.4185 5.4385 0.6302 10.4531 0.4503 6.0166 0.6030 7.8518 0.5402 5.8312 
POPGR -197.6986 -2.4475 -115.7539 -1.6607 151.0852 1.3129 15.6318 0.0680 977.3303 2.6498 
GDPCAPGR -11.6929 -0.9924 -0.9567 -0.0936 7.4075 0.4253 -2.5403 -0.0832 -92.9458 -1.7863
INTRATE -11.5068 -2.1818 -26.1431 -6.3923 -36.9879 -5.6323 -53.0464 -4.3804 -95.2955 -4.5479
D1 214.4218 1.3416 133.5758 1.0013 278.7776 1.2885 476.9903 1.2494 -870.1880 -1.5493
D2 367.6829 2.1212 177.1086 1.2343 -510.1285 -2.0984 -256.8550 -0.5384 -3,670.6612 -3.7482
D3 356.3003 2.0302 145.1574 0.9900 -22.5293 -0.0935 -549.6834 -1.2755 -2,453.6311 -3.4107
D4 183.2687 1.1249 191.1150 1.4066 -45.3461 -0.1882 -192.6035 -0.4410 -2,199.1188 -2.9792
D5 443.6969 2.2887 263.8406 1.6900 -203.8612 -0.7841 -664.1697 -1.3270 -3,804.0969 -4.1080
D6 -413.4273 -2.4442 -264.3208 -1.7607 -949.4273 -3.6702 -1,129.6143 -2.3851 -894.1020 -0.8206
Dependent Variable INVENT
Centered R2 0.6738 Centered R2 0.8389 Centered R2 0.8737 Centered R2 0.9121 Centered R2 0.8828
Variable Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Constant -1,690.0035 -0.8130 5,648.6750 2.2202 -1,697.0383 -1.1635 -116.9765 -0.6896 -57.5370 -0.5364
INVENT{1} 0.7073 9.2155 0.7999 12.7977 0.8290 16.3870 0.8138 16.6369 0.8104 11.0055 
RPSQM{1} 0.6405 1.4340 -0.8518 -1.7667 0.2813 1.3225 0.0189 1.1427 0.0037 0.4926 
POPGR 126.1198 0.2838 648.5733 1.1764 267.7734 0.8314 67.1643 1.4876 37.9788 1.4305 
GDPCAPGR 101.4758 1.6290 -93.2756 -1.1728 58.8675 1.2109 7.8210 1.3121 2.1049 0.5571 
INTRATE -19.9099 -0.6954 -57.5999 -1.5505 -40.7166 -2.0576 -8.6408 -3.1725 -3.3230 -2.1178
D1 1,336.3683 1.4754 1,742.2849 1.5884 1,547.7445 2.2586 266.7355 3.0864 91.1782 1.9079 
D2 -444.6991 -0.4633 -1,213.0126 -1.0546 66.5726 0.0982 -15.9663 -0.1740 -13.1150 -0.1860
D3 -116.4038 -0.1199 -1,153.9038 -0.9820 -76.0518 -0.1134 -47.9217 -0.5642 -33.0737 -0.6391
D4 -128.3813 -0.1422 214.9755 0.2078 244.2480 0.3629 80.1840 0.8659 7.1451 0.1364 
D5 -50.4872 -0.0482 -1,310.8675 -1.0466 346.9189 0.4736 -10.5154 -0.1073 -35.9508 -0.5718
D6 118.7192 0.1287 -2,323.9458 -2.0026 506.4100 0.6991 7.0068 0.0749 -8.9818 -0.1150
SOCIAL ECONOMICA MEDIA RESIDENCIAL RESIDENCIAL PLUS
 
Figure 31: Table of Statistical Results 
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FORECASTING 
The model then uses forecasts of the economic independent variables provided by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In the case of Real GDP per Capita Growth, each state’s real GDP was used to 
calculate the average growth rate of each state within the analyzed time frame (1994-2009). The states’ 
average growth rates were then compared to the national average growth rate over the same period to 
generate a ratio between the two. The ratio was then applied to IMF estimates of national GDP growth 
to obtain states GDP growth forecasts. This implies that states GDPs will continue to grow at a pace that 
maintains the ratio with national GDP growth. 
Midyear Numbers 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Population (millions) 107.6 108.4 109.2 110.0 110.8 111.6 112.3 113.0 113.7 114.4 115.1 0.7
     Annual % change 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Households (millions) 27.5 28.1 28.7 29.3 29.9 30.5 31.1 31.7 32.3 32.9 33.5 2.0
     Annual % change 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
Housing Stock (millions) 26.7 27.3 27.9 28.5 29.1 29.6 30.2 30.8 31.4 31.9 32.5 2.0
     Annual % change 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
Occupants per Home (# persons) 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 -1.3
     Annual % change -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Sources: CONAPO
Demographic Forecasts
10 Yr Annual % 
change
 
Figure 32: Demographic Forecasts 
Population growth was calculated from estimates provided by the National Population Council 
(CONAPO), which provides forecasts of demographic variables up to the year 2030. Housing has a 
natural, strong correlation with population and household growth, according to Sara Topelson of 
Sedesol, who states, “housing demand will be three times as high as demographic growth, and nearly 
80% is expected to be found in metropolitan areas where over 75% of the population is expected to live 
by the year 2030”
44
. All city level calculations were done according to CONAPO’s official delimitation of 
metropolitan areas
45
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
44
 “Estado Actual de la Vivienda en Mexico 2008” CIDOC foundation and SHF, November 2008. 
45
 Delimitación de las zonas metropolitanas de México 2005. 
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All segments and cities seem to behave in a way that is consistent with national performance. Prices 
remain relatively stable after falling as a result of the 1994/1995 crisis, and sales increase with the 
improvement of macroeconomic conditions and the return of private banks to the housing capital 
markets. 
The forecasts seem logical, with prices and sales adjustments expected in 2009 and 2010 in response to 
the current housing market situation. After a small adjustment in prices the model forecasts prices will 
remain relatively stable, except for the high-end residential market (Residencial Plus) where the model 
projects a stronger downward adjustment on prices, responding to the pronounced increase realized in 
this segment in the recent past. 
After the adjustment in sales the model forecasts sales to continue growing but at a much slower pace 
than that experienced leading up to 2007, when housing markets grew at historic rates. The slower sales 
growth is consistent with expectations of many housing market participants. 
As expected when using a supply driven model, inventories and sales appear highly correlated such that 
higher inventories drive higher sales, and lower inventories result in fewer sales.  
Forecasts seem to agree with the regional analysis and with developers defensive housing strategies. 
The results show greater opportunity in the most affordable housing (social), with stabilized prices and 
the highest sales growth. The high-end residential market (Residencial Plus) trend demonstrates the 
worst performance with a more prominent price adjustment and a slower sales pace. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The housing industry in Mexico still offers attractive investment and development potential, with 
appealing average returns and exceptional additional upside. However, there is no doubt that the 
market is maturing and that industry players must begin to employ more sophisticated strategies in 
order to remain relevant. 
It is anticipated that only sophisticated, opportunistic developers that are able to identify under-served 
submarkets and to deliver the appropriate product will survive the recessionary economic climate. The 
VAR model developed in this thesis offers a solid framework within which to measure and forecast 
Mexican housing markets. It provides a flexible analytical tool that may be used to measure and forecast 
market performance and trends through the relation between dependant housing variables and 
fundamental variables of real estate development. This valuable tool permits analysts to make educated 
guesses about expected market behavior, and to strategize and plan accordingly. The model also 
enables comprehensive sensitivity analysis for different scenarios and outcomes of the independent 
variables. 
The resultant forecasts allow developers to identify markets with greater opportunity, while providing 
the requisite information with which to avoid the development of over–supply in a certain market, of a 
specific product type. The VAR tool will also help housing financing entities to create mortgage 
origination thresholds, in turn allowing them to decide which regions and which segments or product 
types to finance. An auxiliary effect is a reduction in delinquency rates, as lenders finance projects with a 
higher likelihood of success. 
This analysis also enables mortgage lenders to improve capital allocation mechanisms. Lenders are 
forced to consider true market demand for mortgage financing, mitigating the need to redistribute 
resources that were inappropriately assigned. 
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In the same way, the analysis may help government agencies and policy makers create a more 
thoughtful method for assigning subsidies or creating housing support programs for cities, product 
types, and income levels that need it the most.  
For further analysis a larger sample of cities may contribute to a more rigorous and reliable model. The 
flexibility of the model also allows repeated testing with different variables, which may add significance 
and may be used to help explain the market. If too many variables were to be added to the model, 
Bayesian model selection methods could be implemented to the VAR framework. Bayesian VAR models 
have proven to work well with large datasets that include many variables. A simple VAR model typically 
doesn’t exceed 18 variables. The virtue of the Bayesian model is that one can begin with the “full 
model” (or with an overparametrized model) and then search for restrictions over the parameter 
space
46
. 
A model with a larger sample of cities would also allow the grouping of cities, which would facilitate 
regional analyses. A regional analysis could, for example, allow us to forecast the markets for border or 
beach cities.  The specific regional model could then be tested with variables that help explain those 
respective markets’ strong correlation with the US economy.  
                                                           
46
 Korobilis, Dimitris, 2007, “Forecasting in VAR models with large datasets,” Department of Economics, University 
of Strathclyde. 
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APPENDIX 
EXHIBIT A: MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Population (millions) 89.5 91.1 92.6 93.9 95.3 96.6 98.0 99.0 100.0 101.0 102.1 103.1 104.2 105.3 106.3 107.4 108.5 109.5 110.6 111.7 112.9
     Annual % change 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Inflation - INPC end of period (index 2000=100) 30.7 46.6 59.6 69.2 81.9 91.9 100.0 104.3 110.2 114.5 120.3 124.3 129.3 134.1 142.9 147.9 152.5 157.1 161.8 166.7 171.8
Inflation - INPC end of period (annual % change) 7.1 52.0 27.7 16.2 18.4 12.1 8.9 4.3 5.6 3.9 5.1 3.3 4.0 3.7 6.5 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Real GDP (billions of pesos from 2003) 6,032       5,660       5,951       6,354       6,666       6,924       7,381       7,370       7,431       7,556       7,858       8,110       8,526       8,810       8,929        8,601        8,688          9,099          9,598       10,110        10,605        
Real GDP (annual % change) 4.4 -6.2 5.2 6.8 4.9 3.9 6.6 -0.2 0.8 1.7 4.0 3.2 5.1 3.3 1.3 -3.7 1.0 4.7 5.5 5.3 4.9
Real GDP per Capita (pesos from 2003) 67,357    62,094     64,288     67,651     69,983     71,690     75,346     74,446     74,305     74,794     76,999     78,671    81,807    83,694     83,982      80,098      80,112        83,071        86,755     90,478        93,970        
Real GDP per Capita (annual % change) 2.6 -7.8 3.5 5.2 3.4 2.4 5.1 -1.2 -0.2 0.7 2.9 2.2 4.0 2.3 0.3 -4.6 0.0 3.7 4.4 4.3 3.9
TIIE 28 average (%) ne 55.2 33.6 21.9 26.9 24.1 17.0 12.9 8.2 6.8 7.1 9.6 7.5 7.7 8.3 5.9 5.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
CETES 28 average (%) 14.1 48.4 31.4 19.8 24.8 21.4 15.2 11.3 7.1 6.2 6.8 9.2 7.2 7.2 7.7 5.4 5.1 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
Unemployment Rate 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.0 5.1
Total Private Formal Employment (annual % change) 0.6 -5.4 2.6 7.7 7.8 5.7 5.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 1.1 3.1 4.6 4.2 0.1 0.0
Real Construction GDP (annual % change) 8.4 -23.5 9.8 9.3 4.2 5.0 4.2 -5.7 2.1 3.3 5.3 2.5 7.9 3.0 0.0 0.3
Residential Construction Prices (annual % change)
     General 4.6 45.6 25.4 15.9 19.1 14.4 7.6 3.5 3.5 6.9 12.2 -0.4 8.5 3.0 9.6
     Materials 4.0 49.0 24.1 19.2 18.6 15.4 6.9 2.2 2.7 7.2 14.8 -1.6 10.0 2.6 11.4
     Labor 7.4 31.4 31.3 1.0 21.9 8.8 11.2 10.1 7.6 5.4 4.4 3.7 4.0 4.4 3.5
Sources: Banco de México, INEGI, BBVA Bancomer, IMF
Macroeconomic and Construction Indicators
Projections
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EXHIBIT B: HOUSING FINANCING 
 
Housing Financing
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of Loans and Subsidies Originated (thousands)
Total 196.3 279.5 331.9 326.8 400.3 500.7 532.0 525.6 655.5 636.9 619.2
Annual % change 42.4 18.7 -1.5 22.5 25.1 6.3 -1.2 24.7 -2.8 -2.8
     Infonavit 105.6 195.4 250.1 200.5 268.7 291.4 300.8 371.7 418.0 456.0 500.0
     Fovissste 15.3 17.9 24.3 26.6 11.1 66.4 59.4 48.7 76.5 70.5 80.0
     Fonhapo 5.5 6.4 6.7 21.1 24.1 23.1 31.0 33.0 91.5 35.7 21.8
     SHF 55.4 59.1 46.7 47.6 46.1 54.2 65.3 54.4 37.1 32.6 32.9
     Private Banks and SOFOLES 2.0 0.8 0.8 3.7 9.7 20.7 37.5 49.0 92.8 191.2 220.0
     Others 3.2 27.3 40.5 44.8 37.9 21.5 17.3 14.4 19.0
     Reduction** -52.8 -77.7 -163.5 -254.4
Financing Flow (Constant thousands of millions of pesos*)
Total 43.5 65.6 84.2 85.6 100.5 142.4 157.7 174.2 232.5 255.9 252.1
Annual % change 50.8 28.4 1.7 17.4 41.7 10.7 10.5 33.5 10.1 -1.5
     Infonavit 25.2 48.1 61.8 50.8 66.2 69.4 69.8 88.9 100.6 108.0 102.0
     Fovissste 3.3 4.3 5.0 6.8 4.6 21.7 20.2 17.5 27.6 23.6 22.3
     Fonhapo 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.1 1.3 1.4 2.2 1.9 4.1 2.0 1.7
     SHF/Fovi 7.3 6.0 9.3 17.0 13.2 17.5 24.2 19.3 12.5 12.2 11.5
     Private Banks and SOFOLES 1.8 0.7 0.9 3.2 7.7 13.4 25.8 46.6 87.7 110.2 114.6
Private Bank Mortgage Loans
Balance end of period (tmp) 52.4 51.2 50.2 49.4 50.9 56.4 73.6 135.8 204.4 251.3
Delinquency Rate 33.4 22.3 13.7 12.6 11.2 8.4 6.1 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.4
Sources: Softec, Banco de México, BBVA Bancomer, SHF, CONAVI
* Pesos from June 2008
** Refers to loans or subsidies considered in two or more institutions  
